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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
RONNIE LEE GARDNER, 
Appellant/Petitioner. 
REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE 
TO APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
Case No. 021027 
Priority No. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Statement of Issues, Statement of the Case, and 
Summary of the Argument are set forth in Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing at vii-3. Appellant takes this opportunity to briefly 
reply to the State's Response to his Petition for Rehearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE A 
LIMITING INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE USE OF WAYNE 
JORGENSON'S TESTIMONY WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In its response to Appellant's Petition for Rehearing 
("Response"), the State argues that if error occurred in the 
admission of Officer Jorgenson's testimony, such error was not 
manifest and prejudicial. Response at 3-9. Consistent with its 
opening brief, the State does not argue that Officer Jorgenson's 
testimony was admissible for substantive purposes. 
In arguing that the error was not manifest and 
prejudicial, the State first contends that "it is not clear that 
such a limiting instruction was required" and that "there is some 
criticism of the use of limiting instructions which suggests that 
juries do not understand such a subtle distinction in the use of 
evidence. [Citation omitted.]" Response at 5. Although the State 
cited United States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616, 624-5, n.10, 11 (5th 
Cir. 1976) in support of this latter proposition, the criticism 
alluded to by the Sisto Court revolved around "the evidentiary rule 
limiting the use of prior unsworn inconsistent statements of a 
witness to impeachment of that witness" (Sisto, 534 F.2d at 624) and 
not the use of limiting instructions once it has been determined 
that the evidence is admissible for the limited purpose of 
impeaching credibility.1 
Contrary to the implication in the State's brief that 
Sisto supports an argument that the jury would not understand the 
distinction in the use of the evidence even if it had been properly 
instructed, Sisto actually supports the opposite argument—that a 
properly instructed jury would understand the distinction and 
1 Although the Sisto Court acknowledged that the rule 
limiting the use of prior inconsistent statements has been 
criticized, it also pointed out that 
Despite the criticism, every circuit follows 
the "orthodox rule" that "prior inconsistent 
statements may be used to impeach, but should not 
be treated as having any substantive or 
independent testimonial value," United States v. 
Tavares, 9 Cir. 1975, 512 F.2d 872, 874. See 
cases cited, id. at 874-75 n.6. 
534 F.2d at 625 n.ll. The Sisto Court went on to "adhereM to the 
orthodox view that the danger of prejudice, whether from deliberate 
fraud or from faulty recollection, inherent in the admission of such 
statements as direct evidence far outweighs any probative value they 
might have." Id. at 625. 
- 2 -
correctly apply it. The Sisto Court emphatically stated: 
Second, we must assume that a properly instructed 
jury would in fact limit its consideration of [the 
witness1] testimony to the issue of the 
[co-conspirator' s] credibility. 
Id. at 625, 
The Court stated further that prior decisions of the 
Court "are bottomed on the conviction that a carefully instructed 
jury can indeed be led to understand the distinction and abide by 
itow Id. at 625. Hence, Sisto supports the proposition that the 
jury should have been instructed as to the limited use to be made of 
Officer Jorgenson's testimony, and that if the jury had been 
properly instructed, it would have understood and followed such 
instructions. See also United States v. Lester, 491 F.2d 680 (6th 
Cir. 1974) (conviction reversed where trial court failed to instruct 
jury as to limited use of evidence). 
The State acknowledges that the trial court gave a 
limiting instruction in United States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919 
(10th Cir. 1979), one of the few cases dealing with a statement 
taken in violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel which was 
admitted for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness. 
However, the State strains to interpret that instruction as one 
which "did not in fact limit the jury's use of the statements." 
Response at 7. Contrary to such an assertion, the limitng 
instruction informed the jury that the evidence was "to be used by 
you only in connection or as to the question of impeachment of the 
testimony of the defendant." McManaman, 606 F.2d at 924. A poorly 
- 3 -
worded sentence at the end of that instruction does not detract from 
the clear mandate to the jury as to the use to be made of the 
evidence. See discussion in Appellant's Petition at 5-7. 
The State points out that in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 
222, 223 (1971), the United States Supreme Court "even noted that 
both counsel argued the substance of the statements and did not find 
that such substantive use was improper.n Response at 7. While the 
United States Supreme Court did acknowledge that both attorneys 
argued in closing "the substance of the impeaching statements[]" 
(401 U.S. at 223), the Court did not directly address the propriety 
of such argument. Furthermore, unlike the instant case, the trial 
court gave a limiting instruction in Harris. Hence, the State's 
assertion that "Harris disposes of this issue [as to whether the 
substantive use of the evidence in closing prejudices the defendant 
where no limiting instruction was given]" is incorrect. Response at 
8. 
The factors surrounding the taking of the statement 
should have made the fifth and sixth amendment violations obvious to 
the trial judge. The statement was taken by an officer guarding 
Mr. Gardner after he had been arraigned on the charges and without 
the presence of counsel. The custodial interrogation flagged the 
fifth amendment issue for the judge; the lack of counsel following 
arraignment flagged the sixth amendment violation. Furthermore, 
although the jury could not be expected to ascertain that the 
testimony was applicable only to Mr. Gardner's credibility where the 
evidence came in during rebuttal, the failure of the State to 
- 4 
introduce such damaging evidence during its case-in-chief should 
have alerted the judge as to the limited use of the testimony. 
As set forth in Appellant's Reply Brief at 31, 
"Officer Jorgenson's testimony was the only testimony which 
indicated that Mr. Gardner knowingly shot Michael Burdell." See 
also Appellant's opening Brief at 79; Petition for Rehearing at 
7-10. Despite the State's assertions to the contrary, overwhelming 
evidence showing that Mr. Gardner intended to kill Mr. Burdell does 
not exist in this case. Mr. Gardner had been shot in the lung prior 
to shooting Mr. Burdell (R. 2006, 2225). When Mr. Macri was face to 
face with Mr. Gardner immediately before the shooting, Mr. Gardner 
looked "very confused," "blank" and "helpless" (R. 2240). See 
Appellant's opening Brief at 99-103. Although Mr. Gardner did know 
a gun would be at the drinking fountain, and took the gun when he 
located it, possession of a gun does not automatically establish an 
intent to kill. Furthermore, pulling a trigger to use a gun does 
not establish that the perpetrator had the requisite intent for 
capital homicide. 
Given the limited evidence supporting a finding that 
Mr. Gardner had the requisite intent, coupled with the overwhelming 
impact of Officer Jorgenson's testimony, it cannot be said that the 
error in admitting the testimony and using it for substantive 
purposes was harmless. Mr. Gardner respectfully requests that this 
Court grant rehearing on this issue. 
- 5 -
POINT II. THE ERRONEOUS MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION 
REQUIRES REVERSAL. 
In requesting rehearing on this issue, Mr» Gardner's 
position is that this Court's decision makes too broad a sweep in 
finding any error to be harmless and the fact that defendant was 
involved in another crime should not preclude jury consideration of 
whether the explanation was excusable. 
Although the State claims that the hypothetical 
situations set forth in Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 12-13 
"are not situations in which the actor's criminal activity produced 
the emotional disturbance[]" (Response at 11), on the contrary, some 
of such examples do involve situations where the criminal activity 
at least arguably produces the emotional disturbance; e.g. the 
examples of sleep deprivation brought on by cocaine consumption and 
medication imbalance as the result for obtaining additional drugs 
through a forged prescription. Jury assessment of the 
reasonableness of an explanation should not be precluded simply 
because the defendant was involved in another crime which may have 
led to or produced the emotional disturbance. 
The State claims that "[i]t would be a ludicrous result 
if any person who attempted to escape lawful custody could claim as 
mitigation of intentional murder the fact that he was upset when his 
escape plans went awry either because of his unfamiliarity with the 
gun or because he was wounded." Response at 12. However, an intent 
to escape does not automatically equate with an intent to kill so as 
to warrant imposition of a death penalty. The physical and mental 
- 6 -
trauma to an individual as the result of being shot in the lung 
could well result in the indiscriminate pulling of a trigger. The 
jury should decide whether the excuse is reasonable and factor into 
that decision the fact that the defendant was involved in the 
commission of another crime. Whether the other crime was tangential 
or integral to the emotional disturbance and whether the excuse was 
therefore reasonable should be left to the jury. Manslaughter 
should not be disregarded simply because the defendant was involved 
in another crime. 
Mr. Gardner acknowledges this Court's statement as set 
forth in footnoote 2 that "generally an error in a manslaughter 
instruction where the jury finds an intentional killing is not 
prejudicial." State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 13 (1989). 
However, as set forth in Point III of Mr. Gardner's Petition for 
Rehearing, the trial court's erroneous oral instruction precluded 
the jury from ever considering whether Mr. Gardner suffered from an 
extreme emotional disturbance. Hence, the "general" rule finding no 
prejudice where the jury found an intentional killing alluded to in 
footnote 2 is not applicable in this case where the oral instruction 
precluded the jury from considering manslaugther. 
POINT III. THE ORAL INSTRUCTION WHEN READ IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH THE OTHER INSTRUCTIONS PRECLUDED 
THE JURY FROM CONSIDERING MANSLAUGHTER, REQUIRING 
REVERSAL. 
The State agrees that "in a case where a defendant has 
raised a legitimate extreme emotional disturbance defense, a jury 
- 7 -
should probably be directed to consider the existence of such a 
disturbance after a finding of intentional or knowing murder[]w 
(Response at 13), but argues that the manslaughter defense was not 
legitimate in this case. 
As argued in Point II, whether the disturbance was 
reasonable should have been left to the jury and not discarded 
simply because Mr. Gardner had been involved in another crime. Had 
the jury been properly instructed, both as to the nature of a 
manslaughter defense and the order in which it should consider the 
offenses, the State's position would be more tenable. However, 
where the jury was not given the opportunity to determine whether 
Mr. Gardner's involvement in criminal activity produced the 
emotional disturbance and, if so, whether the emotional disturbance 
was therefore unreasonable, error requiring reversal occurred in 
this case. 
POINT IV. THIS COURT SHOULD REACH THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION OF SUBSECTION (h) OR, 
ALTERNATIVELY, PROVIDE MR. GARDNER RELIEF UNDER 
STATE V. JAMES. 
Mr. Gardner challenges this Court's ruling regarding the 
subsection (h) issue asserting that (a) the facts of the case could 
have and should have been separated from the prior convictions 
introduced by the State through subsection (h); (b) contrary to the 
Court's characterization of the facts, prosecutors did not limit the 
use of prior convictions to the element of subsection (h) but, 
rather, urged that Mr. Gardner acted in conformity with the prior 
crimes and that the prior crimes showed the intent of Mr. Gardner; 
- 8 -
and (c) the evidence of Mr. Gardner's intent was not overwhelming, 
and the Court erroneously concluded that any error of subsection (h) 
evidence was harmless. Because of the mischaracterizations of the 
facts of the case, Mr. Gardner urges that this Court rehear the 
issue and reach the question of the constitutionality of 
subsection (h) or, alternatively, provide Mr. Gardner with the 
benefit of this Court's ruling in State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 
1989). 
The State responded to Mr. Gardner's Petition for 
Rehearing by reiterating this Court's opinion and by asserting 
several additional arguments to which Mr. Gardner briefly responds. 
The State argues that "even if this Court did strike this 
circumstance [subsection (h)] for the initial guilt phase 
determination on constitutional grounds, defendant cannot evade the 
other two aggravating circumstances and any error in the 
introduction of the two robberies would be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Brief of Respondent at 16. The State's premise 
is incorrect. Several federal circuit courts of appeal and the 
United States Supreme Court have discussed the issue of what happens 
when one of several aggravating circumstances was erroneously 
admitted or later rejected on appeal on grounds of 
unconstitutionality. Examining those opinions discloses the error 
of the State's position. 
In Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1987), 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals extensively analyzed this issue 
concluding that when state capital sentencing schemes require a 
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balancing and/or weighing of aggravating circumstances against 
mitigation evidence that a rejection of the propriety of one 
aggravating circumstance out of several requires that the jury 
verdict be vacated and the process reinitiated. Id. at 1483. The 
United States Supreme Court affirmed that position as correct. 
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. , 100 L.Ed.2d 372, 382-83, 108 
S.Ct. (1988). See also Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th 
Cir. 1985), cert, denied 447 U.S. 1013 (1986). 
A recent decision from this Court buttresses the analysis 
of Mr. Gardner's position. In State v. Mitchell, 116 Utah Adv. Rep. 
3 (August 30, 1989), this Court clarified its role in examining 
harmless error determinations. This Court noted: 
[T]he reviewing court is to decide whether, 
considering all the evidence, there was a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have 
decided the case differently. If such a 
likelihood exists, defendant is entitled to have a 
jury consider the case anew, free from the taint 
of the inadmissible evidence. The reasonable 
likelihood question is not just the substantial 
evidence test in disguise; rather, it focuses on 
the taint caused by the error. If the taint is 
sufficient, it is irrelevant that there is 
sufficient untainted evidence to support a 
verdict. Any stricter interpretation of harmful 
error . . . runs the risk of substituting our 
judgment for that of the jury and could be 
criticized as encouraging the improper admission 
of evidence by defacto weakening the sanctions 
against it. 
Mitchell, 116 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6 (citations omitted). Accordingly, 
Mr. Gardner insists that the erroneous introduction of 
subsection (h) evidence into the guilt phase of this trial 
sufficiently prejudiced him such that a new trial is warranted. 
- 10 -
The State next urges that when the prosecutor argued the 
prior convictions to establish intent (see Petition for Rehearing at 
20-25), he did so properly under the exceptions of Rule 404(b). 
Brief of Respondent at 16, That position is contrary to the facts 
of this case and the governing law. Rule 404(b) states: 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to 
prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs or acts. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). This Court has noted 
that other crimes evidence is not admissible unless it has "a 
special relevance to a controverted issue and is introduced for a 
purpose other than to show the defendant's predisposition to 
criminality." State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988) (citing 
State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985)). To be 
admissible, the prior conviction evidence must prove some fact 
material to the crime charged. State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 
(Utah 1982). In State v. Forsyth, this Court stated: 
Evidence is not admitted merely because it shows a 
common plan, scheme, or a manner of operation. 
Instead, evidence of a common plan, scheme, or 
manner of operation is admitted where it tends to 
prove some fact material to the crime charged. 
Id. at 1176-77. While Rule 404(b) places intent with the other 
articulated exceptions of plan, scheme, or manner or operation, as 
permissible reasons to admit evidence of past crimes, the State is 
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incorrect in arguing that the prior crimes in this case somehow 
prove the material element of intent required for the conviction of 
a capital homicide. Cases interpreting Rule 404(b) have required 
much more of a nexus than that urged here by the State. See 
State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987) (evidence of prior 
forgery conviction admissible in burglary/forgery trial where a 
unique and common scheme was employed by the defendant in both cases 
and where his identity was also in issue); State v. McClain, 706 
P.2d 603 (Utah 1985) (admission into evidence of nine other returned 
checks from the same three-month period was proper in a bad check 
case to allow inference of the defendant's knowledge, intent, or the 
absence of mistake); State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982) 
(blank checks found in defendant's car which were identical to 
checks fraudulently endorsed by a companion were admissibLe at his 
trial to allow inference of knowlege of the fraud and intentional 
participation in the forgery; State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 
1980) (evidence of prior acts in Arizona of accepting and keeping 
money for machines he failed to deliver to merchants, though 
uncharged, were admissible against defendant at his trial for the 
same behavior in Utah because of the proximity in time, uniqueness 
of the operation, and to allow inference of knowledge and intent). 
Comparing the above cases to the facts of Mr. Gardner's 
case demonstrates that the State's argument is nothing more than a 
subterfuge to allow the admission of his prior crimes evidence to 
stand. In reality, the only value of that evidence was for the 
jurors to surmise that Mr. Gardner acted in conformity with his 
- 12 -
criminal past as actually argued by the prosecutor in closing. See 
Petition for Rehearing at 22; R. 2519). 
The State next proposes that the introduction of 
Mr. Gardner's other prior convictions was not plain error but rather 
invited error. Brief of Respondent at 17. Several comments on this 
assertion are warranted. First, the facts of this case are 
substantially different than those in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 
(Utah 1987), relied upon by the State. In Tillman, the defendant 
introduced evidence and argued that evidence to the'jury from his 
perspective. The prosecutor then argued that the same evidence, 
from his perspective, established completely different conclusions 
contrary to the interests of the defendant. In Mr. Gardner's case, 
the defendant admitted non-subsection (h) prior convictions through 
error or mistake but never argued or referenced those convictions 
again. However, once introduced, the prosecutor utilized those 
prior convictions to attack credibility and to infer intent. More 
importantly, the prosecutor used the subsection (h) prior 
convictions to also argue intent; and, contrary to the State's 
assertions and the opinion by this Court, it cannot be argued that 
that error by the prosecutor was somehow invited by Mr. Gardner. 
Second, the State's attempt to excuse the introduction of 
the prior convictions because many attorneys in Utah were under the 
impression, prior to State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), 
that such priors were admissible is unpersuasive. State v. Banner 
did not change Rule 609. The plain language of the Rule and cases 
such as State v. Saunders indicated the prejudicial nature of prior 
- 13 -
conviction evidence and the inadmissibility of those convictions in 
this case. The invited error analysis, at a minimum, must fail 
regarding the subsection (h) prior convictions which were introduced 
by the prosecution and which were incorrectly argued by the 
prosecutor to support his assertion that they somehow established 
Mr. Gardner's intent in this particular case. 
With this reply to the State's answer, Mr. Gardner 
respectfully reiterates his position outlined in the Petition for 
Rehearing that this Court rehear this issue and reach the 
constitutionality of subsection (h) or, alternatively, afford him 
the benefit of this Court's decision in State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 
(Utah 1989) . 
POINT V. MR. GARDNER'S RIGHTS TO A 
CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE SENTENCING DETERMINATION 
WERE VIOLATED WHEN MITIGATION EVIDENCE WAS KEPT 
FROM THE JURY. 
Mr. Gardner has requested rehearing on the issue of two 
varieties of mitigation evidence presented at the penalty phase of 
his trial but rejected by the trial court. Petition for Rehearing 
at 27-41. Both this Court, in its opinion, and the State, in 
responding to Mr. Gardner's Petition for Rehearing, have failed to 
recognize and address statutory language which permits the admission 
of the evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2) does not limit mitigation 
evidence to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the character 
of the defendant, his background, and his mental and physical 
- 14 -
history as viewed by this Court and the State. See State v. 
Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10-11; Brief of Respondent at 19-20. 
Rather, the plain language of the statute indicates that evidence 
relevant to sentence includes the above matters but is not limited 
to only that evidence; the section instructs that any other facts in 
mitigation of penalty are also relevant. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-207(2) and (2)(g). Thus, the trial court abused its 
discretion in prohibiting the mitigation evidence jLE the evidence 
was relevant. 
As indicated in the Petition for Rehearing, a variety of 
reasons exist to support the relevance of the proffered evidence. 
The testimony of the friends and associates of Mr. Burdell was 
relevant because (1) it mitigated the possible punishment of death 
allowing jurors to conclude mercy and sympathy warranted life 
imprisonment as punishment, and (2) the prosecutor invited the 
evidence of Mr. Burdell's wishes on punishment when he postulated 
how unfortunate it is that so little is heard about the victim and 
then proceeded to introduce a number of Mr. Burdell's exceptional 
qualities and contributions, now lost.2 See Petition for Rehearing 
at 38; R. 2533. 
2 The prosecutor's comments regarding the victim, 
Mr. Burdell, and his qualities and contributions are themselves 
violative of Mr. Gardner's rights. Both Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 
496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, U.S. , 109 S.Ct. 
2207 (1989), hold that such victim impact commentary has no place in 
the capital sentencing setting. The prosecutor's remarks on this 
point, as in Gathers, requires reversal (South Carolina v. Gathers, 
109 S.Ct. at 2210) or, at a minimum, that the jury fully hear the 
wishes of Mr. Burdell. Either way, Mr. Gardner's death sentence 
must be vacated. 
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The evidence of the affidavits of the other attorneys was 
similarly relevant because (1) the affidavits permitted the jurors 
to mitigate the penalty and impose life rather than death as a 
sentence, (2) the prosecutor invited the evidence by eliciting 
testimony about individuals who had escaped from prison, which had 
nothing to do with the nature and circumstances of this crime or 
Mr. Gardner himself; and (3) an issue not yet discussed by this 
Court or the State, the fact that the affidavits corrected jury 
misinformation about who had or had not received the death penalty 
in Utah. See Petition for Rehearing at 39-41. 
As the evidence proposed was relevant and capable of 
mitigating the penalty from death to life imprisonment, the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying its admission into evidence 
and prejudiced Mr, Gardner's rights. Accordingly, Mr. Gardner 
respectfully requests that this Court grant rehearing on this issue. 
POINT VI. VERDICT FORMS AND PENALTY PHASE 
INSTRUCTIONS IN MR. GARDNER'S CASE PROVIDED AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF DEATH IN THE MINDS 
OF THE JURORS. 
Mr. Gardner urges in his Petition for Rehearing that the 
verdict forms presented to the jurors impermissibly established 
death as the presumed penalty. Under the verdict forms utilized by 
the court in his case, the sentence of life was attainable only 
through default—failure to unanimously reach a decision of death. 
In its answer, the State mischaracterizes the issue 
raised by Mr. Gardner. The State asserts that somehow Mr., Gardner 
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wants to create a new requirement that unanimity is a prerequisite 
for a life sentence. As the State itself suggests, that assertion 
is indeed preposterous. For clarification, Mr. Gardner is not 
asking for a new presumption nor new evidentiary requirements. He 
only asks that this Court require that the verdict forms submitted 
to the jury reflect the appropriate focus of the penalty phase—life 
not death being the presumed penalty. See Petition for Rehearing at 
42-46. 
Mr. Gardner insists that the verdict forms as submitted 
necessarily guided the jurors to attain a unanimous verdict of 
death, allowing them to reach a life sentence by default only. As 
argued in the Petition for Rehearing, that system is 
unconstitutionally skewed. Such a system ignores the entire body of 
law which recognizes that the death penalty is a unique penalty and 
occurs in only a minority of capital cases, let alone homicide cases 
in general. See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982); State v. 
Holland, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (June 21, 1989). To the extent Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-207(3) permits the behavior challenged in this 
issue, the statute is similarly fatally flawed. 
Accordingly, Mr. Gardner asks that rehearing be granted 
on this issue. 
POINT VII. THE UTAH DEATH PENALTY SCHEME 
IMPERMISSIBLY SHIFTS THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE 
DEFENDANT AT THE SENTENCING PHASE OF THE CAPITAL 
TRIAL. 
Mr. Gardner asserts that this Court failed to reach the 
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question of whether the Utah death penalty scheme impermissibly 
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant in the penalty phase of 
the capital trial, and he asks for rehearing on this issue. The 
State suggests that no rehearing is necessary because even if this 
question is not answered by the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988), this Court 
has reached this very issue in Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812 (Utah 
1980) . See State's Brief at 25. The State's reliance on Pierre v. 
Morris demonstrates why rehearing this issue is appropriate. 
In Pierre v. Morris, Chief Justice Hall wrote the opinion 
indicating that the burden of proof was not shifted to the defendant 
in the penalty phase, rather defendant only bears the burden of 
going forward. Id. at 815. That opinion, however, was joined by 
only one Justice, with two other Justices concurring in the result 
and the final Justice dissenting. Thus, the Pierre v. Morris 
opinion is a plurality opinion. Furthermore, Justice Stewart, who 
concurred in the result in Pierre v. Morris, has written an opposing 
view in State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). In Brown, Justice Stewart stated: 
In the penalty phase, after guilt has been proved, 
the jury is necessarily aware that it has found an 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and the prosecution, in arguing for 
imposition of the death penalty, will undoubtedly 
dwell upon that fact. If the jury may impose 
death merely by finding that aggravating 
circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances (a 
preponderance of evidence test) a death penalty is 
virtually assured. 
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Id. at 273-74. While it is true that Justice Stewart's comments in 
Brown predate this Court's opinion in State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 
(Utah 1981), which changed the standard of balancing aggravating 
circumstances against mitigating circumstances from a preponderance 
to beyond a reasonable doubt, that change does not reallocate the 
"defacto" shift of the burden from the defendant back to the 
prosecution. Accordingly, this Court has yet to decisively answer 
the question Mr. Gardner now presents. 
Mr. Gardner points to the arguments by the prosecutor in 
his penalty phase to demonstrate that the evil recognized by Justice 
Stewart in Brown is, in fact, a reality. The prosecutor vigorously 
argued that the three aggravating circumstances already found beyond 
a reasonable doubt by the jurors in the guilt phase were again 
applicable to the penalty phase and were of great weight 
(R. 2844-46). See Addendum A for complete text of his argument on 
this point. From that moment on, it was incumbent on Mr. Gardner to 
prove that the great weight of those aggravating circumstances were 
outweighed by mitigation evidence. Such a shift creates much more 
than a change in the burden of going forward; the shift creates a 
realistic and onerous change in the burden of proof. 
The State suggests that because jurors must also find the 
death penalty is the appropriate sentence in this case beyond a 
reasonable doubt (Brief of Respondent at 27), any potential error 
from the above shift in burden is corrected. That urging ignores 
that due process requires the State—never the defendant—to carry 
the burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358 (1970). Accordingly, Mr. Gardner insists that his 
constitutional rights have been violated and that this Court should 
grant rehearing on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gardner respectfully requests that this Court grant 
rehearing on the issues raised in his Petition for Rehearing and 
Supplemental Petition for Rehearing. Mr. Gardner further requests 
that he be permitted oral argument on the issues raised in his 
Petition for Rehearing in order to more fully apprise the Court of 
the merits of those issues. 
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ADDENDUM A 
1 CASE, DOES TOTAL AGGRAVATION OUTWEIGH TOTAL MITIGATION 
2 BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT? NOW, NOTICE TWO THINGS, IF YOU 
3 MIGHT, HERE. THE STATE DOESN'T HAVE TO PROVE THE 
4 EXISTENCE OF AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE BEYOND A 
5 REASONABLE DOUBT, JUST PRESENT EVIDENCE IN WHICH YOU MAY 
6 FIND AGGRAVATION. ALSO, THERE IS NO SPECIFIC AMOUNT THAT 
7 THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE MUST OUTWEIGH THE MITIGATING 
8 CIRCUMSTANCE, JUST THAT YOU ARE SURE BEYOND A REASONABLE 
9 DOUBT THAT IT DOES OUTWEIGH IT. 
10 FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOU COULD QUANTIFY IT -- AND I 
11 KNOW YOU CAN'T -- BUT JUST AS AN EXAMPLE, IF YOU FOUND ON 
12 THE ONE HAND, SAY, 25 POUNDS OF MITIGATION AND ON THE OTHER 
13 HAND 25 POUNDS AND ONE OUNCE OF AGGRAVATION, AND IF YOU 
14 WERE SURE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THAT AGGRAVATION 
15 WEIGHED 25 POUNDS AND ONE OUNCE AND THE MITIGATION ONLY 
16 25 POUNDS, THEN THE AGGRAVATION WOULD OUTWEIGH THE 
17 MITIGATION BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
18 FURTHERMORE, THE COURT HAS INSTRUCTED YOU THAT 
19 YOU CAN CONSIDER AS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE 
20 | THE VERY SAME MATTERS WHICH YOU THOUGHT TO BE AGGRAVATING 
21 I IN THE GUILT PHASE. 
22 NOW, LET ME READ YOU, FROM PAGE k OF THE 
23 INSTRUCTION, SOME AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES UPON WHICH YOU 
^•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••^ 
24 ARE INSTRUCTED, ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
25 "ONE, THE DEFENDANT, RONNIE 
.:L,'.A«C iS* 
1626 






DEATH TO A PERSON 
THE VICTIM, MICHAEL 
BURDELL, AND THE 
DEFENDANT, RONNIE LEE GARDNER." 
NOW, YOU NOTICE THAT THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE 
• • • • H B I I i ^ l l ^ l i H ^ l ^ B I ^ M I H M H M M i l ^ 
THE SAME ONES WHICH YOU FOUND BY YOUR SPECIAL VERDICT IN 
THE GUILT PHASE. SO, OBVIOUSLY, THESE WILL BE ONES THAT 
YOU HAVE ALREADY FOUND BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, EVEN 
THOUGH THAT'S NOT THE STANDARD AND ONES THAT YOU SHOULD 
FIND IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, THE SENTENCING PHASE, TO BE 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. YOU HAVE ALREADY FOUND THAT ONE. 
YOU HAVE ALREADY FOUND THAT BOB MACRI WAS THE 
OTHER PERSON WHOSE LIFE AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME WAS IN 
GREAT DANGER. 
"NUMBER TWO, THE HOMICIDE 
WAS COMMITTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
EFFECTING THE ESCAPE OF THE 
DEFENDANT, RONNIE LEE GARDNER, 
FROM LAWFUL CUSTODY." 
THE FACT THE HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED TO 
EFFECTUATE THE DEFENDANT'S ESCAPE SHOWS THE HOMICIDE WAS 
COMMITTED TO BRING ABOUT ANOTHER VERY SERIOUS CRIME, ESCAPE 
P» 
FROM THE UTAH STATE PRISON. 
"NUMBER THREE, THE DEFENDANT, 
RONNIE LEE GARDNER, WAS 
^• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • fe 
PREVIOUSLY CONVICTED OF A 
^ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • f t 
FELONY INVOLVING THE USE OR 
THREAT OF VIOLENCE TO A 
PERSON, TO WIT : ROBBERY." 
THE FACT THAT THE HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED BY A 
PERSON WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN TWICE CONVICTED OF CRIMES 





















CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU HAVE 
ALREADY FOUND ARE OF GREAT WEIGHT. 
WELL, WHAT OTHER AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES CAN 
YOU CONSIDER? THE KEY, AGAIN, IS LOOK AT THE NATURE OF THE 
CRIME AND THE CHARACTER OF THE DEFENDANT. LET ME SUGGEST 
SOME TO YOU. WHAT ABOUT THE DEFENDANT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD 
THE LEGAL PROCESS? WHAT ABOUT HIS REFUSAL TO ACCEPT 
RESPONSIBIL IT IES FOR HIS ACTS? 
AT THE TIME OF THE HOMICIDE, THE DEFENDANT HAD 
BEEN CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO PRISON FOR SEVERAL FELONIES^ 
BUT EITHER THE DEFENDANT D I D N ' T THINK THESE LEGAL JUDGMENTS 
AND CONVICTIONS WERE PROPER OR HE D IDN 'T CARE BECAUSE FOUR 
TIMES HE ESCAPED OR TRIED TO ESCAPE FROM THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF THOSE JUDICIAL ACTS. AT THE TIME OF THE HOMICIDE ON 
APRIL 2ND OF 1 9 8 5 , THE DEFENDANT HAD ALREADY SHOT AND 
